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Explanation and Understanding 
in Information Systems 
 
 
Dirk S. Hovorka 






Scientific research is intended to provide explanation of phenomena and to increase our understanding of the world. 
However, common usage does not make a distinction between explanation and understanding. Examination of the 
Philosophy of Science literature provides discussion of the explanation-understanding relationship that is valuable for IS 
research. Scientific explanation is traditionally viewed as subsuming individual cases under broad general laws or as 
identifying causal mechanisms that produce specific outcomes. Recent discussion suggests the opportunity for unification of 
these two competing views. In contrast to explanation, understanding is connected to the thoughts, motivations and 
intentionality of the objects under study and to unification of scientific theory. Therefore explanations are arguments 
answering causal “why” questions under broad general laws and understanding results from answering “why” questions 
regarding intentional behavior or from unification of theories. Different explanation types, such as covering-law, statistical 
relevance, pragmatic and functional, underlie and support different aspects of understanding. This research describes the 
tension and opportunity for enhancing knowledge of phenomena by exploiting the explanation-understanding relationship. 
The framework presented is used to examine explanation and understanding in research streams focused on Adaptive 
Structuration Theory and Media Richness Theory. The study proposes that research can either provide explanation, increase 
understanding, or both. Understanding in Information Systems research can be increased by inclusion of multiple explanation 
types and multiple aspects of understanding to add to an ideal explanatory text. Proactive use of the explanation-
understanding relationship can aid researchers in recognizing the scope of current research and choosing appropriate research 
approaches for future work. 
 
Keywords 




“Among philosophers of science and philosophical scientists…there seems to be a fair degree of consensus about the ability 
of science to furnish explanations, and therefore contribute to our understanding of the world” (Salmon, 1998,  p. 76). Yet 
within this consensus there remains significant discussion as to what constitutes an explanation and how explanation differs 
from, or contributes to, our understanding.  
 
Two traditions have dominated discussion of scientific explanation in the past 40 years. Hemple and Oppenheim (1948) 
proposed that explanation consists in subsumption of what is to be explained (the explanandum) under one or more general 
laws of nature. This reductionist tradition had intuitive appeal, particularly in the physical sciences, but is more difficult to 
support in the information systems domain where general laws are less likely to be identified.  The second major tradition 
views explanation as a determination of the cause(s) that produce a specific outcome (Humphreys, 1989). This conception 
formed a cornerstone of positivist ontological tradition (von Wright, 1971) and has produced significant discussion and 
disagreement about the nature of causality and whether all explanation must be causal in nature. The differences in these two 
traditions have been explicated in the form of global and local explanatory accounts (Friedman, 1974), and “top down” and 
“bottom up” (Kitcher, 1985). Explanation either “looks to the most general explanatory schemes we can find and works 
downward to characterize such items as laws and causal relations” (Salmon, 1998,  p. 72) or from “relatively superficial 
causal mechanisms or particular facts… to ever more general types of mechanisms.. to the most ubiquitous mechanisms that 
operate in the universe” (Salmon, 1998,  p. 72). Recent discussion has attempted a rapprochement of these perspectives that 
considers the causal mechanism(s) of a phenomenon to be a separate and complimentary explanation to the broader general 
law explaining the phenomenon (Salmon, 1998). Railton (1981) advocates the concept of the ideal explanatory text which is 
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both global and detailed. Different researchers with varying interests focus on aspects of the ideal text and produce 
explanatory information at different levels of detail. 
 
The concept of scientific understanding also originates in two different traditions. One tradition regards understanding as 
applying in situations where human intentionality, motivation or choice is involved (Salmon, 1998; von Wright, 1971). One 
“understands the aims and purposes of an agent, the meaning of a sign or symbol and the significance of a social institution 
or religious rite” (von Wright, 1971, p. 6). Hermeneutic and historical analyses are typical examples of domains in which 
understanding, rather than explanation is considered the goal. In IS an interpretative ontology, which assumes that “people 
create and associate their own subjective and inter-subjective meaning as they interact with the world” (Orlikowski and 
Baroudi, 1991, p. 5), can be selected to achieve these ends. The second tradition of understanding is based upon greater 
intelligibility of phenomenon through unification of scientific theories (Friedman, 1974; Kitcher, 1976). If fewer independent 
laws or a smaller number of types of law relate to a large class of apparently diverse phenomena, our understanding is 
increased.    
 
This study examines the details of the explanation-understanding relationship and proposes that scientific knowledge of 
information systems results from the combination of multiple, parallel explanation types and includes interpretive 
understanding of human intentionality and motives. Covering-law, statistical-relevance, pragmatic and functional explanation 
all contribute to greater scientific knowledge of phenomena. This study then uses this conceptual framework to analyze 
different aspects of the Adaptive Structuration Theory and Media richness Theory research streams as examples of the 
explanation-understanding relationship. This research proposes that application of the explanation-understanding relationship 
can aid researchers in recognizing the scope and limitations of current research and in subsequent choices of research 




Two Traditions in Scientific Explanation 
 
The search for scientific knowledge can be traced back to ancient times. Early Greek philosophers recognized a fundamental 
distinction between descriptive knowledge that something occurred and explanatory knowledge why something occurred. 
From this division arises a long history of discussions on what constitutes a valid explanation.  Two broad traditions of 
explanation have can be identified in recent discussion (von Wright, 1971; Salmon, 1989b). One flows from the seminal 
work of Hemple and Oppenheim (1948) with the formulation of the deductive and inductive covering-law models of 
scientific explanation. In these models the phenomenon is expected, given a set of explanatory facts which contain at least 
one general law. This strong emphasis on prediction and reproducibility of phenomena is a cornerstone of the positivist 
ontology of scientific inquiry. This approach is considered to be problematic when applied to the study of information 
systems due to the difficulty in identifying covering-laws and the diversity of human behavior under similar environments 
(Fay, 1996). 
 
A fundamentally different tradition of scientific explanation developed in response to criticisms of covering-law concept of 
explanation. This tradition involves achieving knowledge of how things work, and of identifying the causes underlying a 
phenomenon. This approach can be characterized as causal-mechanical explanation (Salmon, 1998). In this tradition 
“explanation in the social sciences and much of the natural sciences results from identifying causes” (Kinkaid, 1996 p. 98). 
For the purpose of this study it is assumed that “all explanations of singular events or states of affairs are causal 
explanations” (Ruben, 1990 p. 35). Causal-mechanical based explanation is fundamentally different from covering-law 
explanation because we cannot logically deduce an outcome from a description of a cause or logically deduce the cause from 
the nature of the outcome. Since these explanations are not logically deduced they cannot be determined a priori and 
therefore are produced through experimentation and observation.  It must be noted that significant debate surrounds causation 
in human behavior. For instance, human behavior can be predicted if the societal or organizational rules or norms are 
understood. Rules may govern behavior but they do not cause behavior (Searle, 2001; Salmon, 1989a). These types of 
arguments raise questions about the primacy of causation as the foundation for explanation. 
 
Recent study of scientific explanation has attempted rapprochement between these traditions. Explanatory unification 
proposes that the two accounts of explanation are not incompatible. Diverse phenomena are often caused by the same 
underlying mechanisms and “to the extent that we find extremely pervasive basic mechanisms, we are also revealing the 
unifying principles of nature” (Salmon, 1998 p. 90). A physical example is the behavior of a helium balloon inside the cabin 
of an accelerating passenger aircraft. The movement of the balloon forward in the cabin can be explained in either of two 
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ways: the causal-mechanical explanation relies on interaction of the cabin walls, air molecules and differential air pressure on 
the balloon as the plane accelerates. The movement can also be explained correctly by reference to an overarching 
generalization of the universe in which acceleration is equivalent to a gravitational field. The balloon’s movement is 
explained in relation to what direction is ‘upward’ in relation to the acceleration, which acts as gravity. Neither of these 
explanations is superior to the other and determination of which explanation to supply is often a pragmatic choice. The 
concept of the ideal explanatory text (Railton, 1981) provides another approach to removing the dichotomy between the 
traditions. Although an ideal text would contain detailed description of the causal mechanisms involved and theoretical 
derivations of all covering or statistical laws involved (Railton, 1981,  p 247), it is recognized that the goal of the individual 
researcher is to produce parts of such an ideal text. Combining multiple parts increases understanding of the phenomena. 
 
Types of Explanation 
 
Within the two explanatory traditions different types of scientific explanation have been proposed. These explanation types 
(Table 1) have formal descriptions and requirements of the relationships they entail that differ from people’s everyday 
conception of explanation. Major explanation types include covering-law (Hemple and Oppenheim, 1948), statistical-
relevance (Salmon 1989b), pragmatic (van Fraassen, 1980), and functional (Wright 1976).  
 
Explanation Type Definition 
Covering-law 
Explanation 
An explanation of either the Deductive-Nomological or Inductive-Statistical type can be 
“described as an argument to the effect that the event to be explained was to be expected by 
virtue of certain explanatory facts” (Salmon, 1989b, p.9). The explanatory facts must contain at 





“An explanation of a particular fact is an assemblage of facts statistically relevant to the fact-to-




An explanation that is a context-dependent answer to a “why-question” (van Fraassen, 1980). 




“Explanations that are framed in terms of ends or goals” (Salmon, 1989b, p.26). A given social 
practice [factor] has a certain effect A. When it has that effect, there is some mechanism that 




Table 1. Definitions of Explanation Types 
Covering-law explanation is based upon the Deductive-Nomological (D-N) and Inductive-Statistical (I-S) models of 
explanation presented by Hemple (1962). Covering-law models present the necessary, logical relationship between the event 
to be explained (explanandum) and a set of explanatory facts that must include at least one general law (explanans). Causal 
covering-law explanation is distinguished from the co-occurrence of events by asserting that whenever X occurs under 
condition C, Y must occur. Support for any theoretical covering-law results from continued confirmatory evidence supplied 
under manipulated conditions intended to suppress or bring about the effect in question. Although covering-law models have 
provided the fountainhead for discussion of explanation they have been challenged as containing a number of inadequacies, 
resulting in development of other explanation types.  
 
Statistical-relevance (S-R) explanation considers multiple causal factors, regardless of the degree of probability they have to 
produce explanatory power (Salmon, 1989a). S-R explanations were developed to account for situations in which wide and 
variable sets of factors operate differently under different conditions or in different combinations. Identification of causal 
relationships and necessary and sufficient conditions (Fay, 1996) in social science explanation is difficult and controversial 
due to the multiplicity and diversity of causes and the incompleteness of our knowledge of causal relationships. Therefore S-
R explanation uses statistical hypothesis testing to develop probabilistic models that can include a large number of causal 
factors. This overcomes the objection to covering-law models of explanation in which the phenomenon to be explained must 
have a high probability of occurrence (Kitcher, 1989). 
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Pragmatic explanation is the fourth type of explanation (van Fraassen, 1980). A pragmatic explanation is an answer to a 
“why-question” that involves not just the relationship between theory and fact, but also the context (Salmon, 1989b), the 
concept of contrast classes and relevance relations. A question “Why outcome A?” becomes “Why outcome A rather than B, 
C…?” The appropriateness of a pragmatic explanation is dependent on the intention of the questioner and the relevance of the 
answer to the questioner’s context. In van Fraassen’s (1980) example of the shadow of the tower. the architect’s explanation 
would result in a blueprint  description, whereas the builder’s explanation might rely on the construction materials and 
stability of the tower. But the relevance relation of the answer to a specific contrast question, “Why is the height h rather than 
h*?” indicates that the length of the shadow cast by the tower was important to the owner. The relevant explanation depends 
on who is asking the question and is specific to that particular question (Kitcher, 1989). A pragmatic explanation may create 
several new questions involving other contrast classes, each of which may have a different explanation. 
  
Functional explanation, the final explanation type, provides legitimate explanations by identifying the end state or goals and 
determining the conditions which led to that end state (Salmon, 1989b). First-person descriptions of behavior frequently 
contain this type of account: for example, “Why did I ride my bike? To get to work.” Notice that getting to work does not 
necessitate riding the bike nor is it a sufficient condition for the behavior since the rider might also have wanted to enjoy a 
nice morning outside (Manicas, 1997). The future goal explains the event, based upon belief that the event will fulfill the 
goal. Wright (1976) predicates functional explanations on the consequences of a feature. A feature’s presence is explained by 
the relationship that when it was present in the past, it had certain results or consequences. 
 
Traditions in Scientific Understanding   
 
A sharp distinction between understanding and explanation is not made in ordinary usage of the terms. All scientific 
explanations, whether pragmatic, functional or some other kind are said to increase our understanding of a phenomenon. But 
this increase in scientific understanding through the production of scientific explanation does indicate that understanding is a 
direct result of the explanatory effort. In addition, understanding has a psychological component or “re-creation in the mind 






Subject of Understanding 
Empathy 
 




Determining the meaning of concepts, symbols, behaviors and other forms of expression. 
Frequently the focus of anthropology and interpretative studies in the social sciences.  
Human Purpose 
 
Inquiry into the reason, intention or purpose underlying human behaviors, institutions and 
customs. Often requires distinguishing the explicit aims from the latent or emergent function. 
 
Natural Phenomena Identification of causal mechanisms and/or of general laws governing natural phenomena. 
 
 
Table 2. Types of Human Understanding 
 
Salmon (1998) describes the distinction in the first tradition between four major types of understanding (Table 2). First there 
is understanding based upon empathy or the sharing of feeling or emotions. This is a psychological rather than semantic 
category (von Wright, 1971) but the theological or metaphysical character it has eliminates it from the current discussion. A 
second type of understanding relates to the meanings of types of human expression in many contexts. These expressions 
include language, symbols, institutions, behaviors and meanings and are frequently the focus of interpretative studies in 
information systems research. A third type of understanding is based upon an appeal to purpose or the intention of the human 
behavior (for a review of intentionality see von Wright, 1971). A person’s trip to the store to purchase aspirin in based upon 
the person’s belief that aspirin is an effective medication for headache and that the store will be a good place to purchase it. It 
is the constellation of beliefs and desires in the context of the end goal that provides understanding rather than the actual 
acquisition of the aspirin. The final type of understanding results from production of scientific explanation of natural 
phenomenon in the empirical sciences. This type of understanding is considered to be the result of empirical studies from a 
positivist ontological stance. 
Proceedings of the Tenth Americas Conference on Information Systems, New York, New York, August 2004                                                    4183
Hovorka                                                                               Explanation and Understanding in Information Systems 
 
 
A second tradition in understanding is based upon phenomena becoming more comprehensible or intelligible as “science 
increases our understanding of the world by reducing the total number of independent phenomena that we have to accept as 
ultimate or given” (Friedman, 1974 p. 15). This concept of explanatory unification is expanded by Kitcher (1989) and 
modified to consider unification of the number of independent laws that must be considered. This synthesis of a wide variety 
of phenomena under a unified scientific world-picture is argued to present a more comprehensible, that is, understandable 
knowledge of the world (Salmon, 1998). Understanding the phenomena “is not simply a matter of reducing the fundamental 
incomprehensibilities but of seeing connections, common patterns, in what initially appeared to be different situations” 
(Kitcher, 1989 p. 432). Newton’s unification of Kepler’s laws of planetary motion, Galileo’s laws of free fall, the pendulum 
and projectiles and the molecular behavior of gases increased our understanding of the universe. The Newtonian synthesis is 
an example of how the tradition of explanatory unification successfully addressed a wide array of phenomena and led to 
understanding of other observations during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Salmon, 1998). 
    
The Explanation-Understanding Relationship 
 
Identification of causal-mechanical processes and of general or probabilistic laws are both valid approaches to developing 
explanations. Different types of explanation can be produced from any ontological or epistemological perspective (for a 
review see Hovorka, Germomprez and Larsen, working paper) and can increase different types of understanding. By 
recognizing that different explanation types lead to different types of understanding we are able to remove the tension 
between understanding of meanings, purpose or intentions and understanding of natural phenomena from positivist science. 
For example, pragmatic explanation that a potential adopter chooses to use one information system instead of a different 
system, based on a perception of usefulness, yields an understanding of that individual’s purpose or intention.  At the same 
time the statistical-relevance explanation of the directionality and degree of influence of other variables increases our 
knowledge of the mechanisms of the phenomena.  
 
The concept of the ideal explanatory text (Railton, 1981) provides a means of removing the dichotomy between traditions in 
explanation and understanding. An ideal text would contain detailed description, at all levels of analysis, of the causal 
mechanisms involved, the theoretical derivations of all covering-laws and understanding of human goals and intentions. 
Combining multiple parts increases scientific knowledge of the phenomena. Therefore the ideal explanatory text can be used 
to evaluate research by determining whether the researcher has added explanation or understanding of the phenomenon. 
 
Examination of two research streams will provide examples of how the explanation-understanding relationship can influence 
research. By developing these examples, this research shows how the concepts of explanation, understanding and an ideal 
explanatory text can be used to design, critique and improve research. 
 
Example 1: Adaptive Structuration Theory 
 
Research on Adaptive Structuration Theory (AST) provides an example of how the explanation-understanding framework 
could produce a research stream. Initially Desanctis and Poole (1994) proposed that during the organization change process 
there is a duality of structures: those that are inherent to the technology, and those that emerge due to human interaction with 
the technology. The authors emphasize the recursive relationship between the technological structures and the social process 
of appropriation of the technology driven by individual purpose and intention. The research question, which was focused on 
organizational change and individual or group purpose, was contained in constructs (Groups Internal System; Social 
Interaction; New Social Structures), which recognized that “people actively select how technology structures are 
used…groups actively select structures from among a large set of potentials” (Desanctis and Poole, 1994, p. 129). The 
authors proposed that determination of the aspects of appropriation would require interpretation to distinguish between 
faithful and unfaithful appropriation. This inquiry regarding a contrast class would produce a pragmatic explanation. The 
emergence of unplanned organizational structures resulting from structuration is strongly associated with functional 
explanation of the appropriated technologies. Although the authors did not explicitly recognize these explanation types, our 
increased understanding of emergent organizational structures results from pragmatic and functional explanations involving 
the constructs.  
 
Chin, Gopal and Salisbury (1997) add to the ideal explanatory text by developing a causal-mechanical measure of the 
faithfulness of appropriation construct and provide statistical-relevance explanation of how the construct causes change in 
other variables (perceived ease of use, satisfaction, perceived usefulness). While emphasizing that user groups intentionally 
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select specific structures in the technology, the study increases our understanding of the dramatic differences between groups 
by showing that causal relationships influence the outcome variables.  
 
These studies contribute explanatory information and increase our understanding of organizational change. But questions 
regarding the nature of the human-technology interactions and the intentions underlying human selection of technology 
structures are left unaddressed. These are aspects critical to understanding the phenomena but appear to be non-causal and not 
governed by generalized laws. 
 
Example 2: Media Richness Theory 
 
Examination of the research stream surrounding Media Richness Theory (MRT) provides a retrospective look at how the 
explanation-understanding framework could be used to identify research opportunities. The original MRT framework 
prescribed law-like relationships between media channels and uncertain tasks (Daft and Lengel 1984). The theory proposed 
that media have inherent, structural characteristics that define the ability to reduce uncertainty in communication. This 
explanation relied on a law-like generalization and did not account for the causal mechanisms of the media channel- task 
relationship. It also did not account for human intention or shared meaning within the communication.  
 
Later research identified the role that social norms, shared meaning and organizational context played in defining media 
richness (Schmitz and Fulk, 1991; Markus, 1994; Lee, 1994). An apparently simple information request was actually rich 
with information and subtle meaning in which single instances of media richness were explained through contextually 
dependent environments. These studies relied on the understanding of shared meaning and the purpose of the 
communication. The theory was also explored experimentally (Dennis and Kinney, 1998) and through a survey-based field 
study (El-Shinnawy and Markus, 1992). In these studies, statistical-relevance explanation was used to describe media 
richness and identified probabilistic causal mechanisms for the relationships proposed. 
  
Ngwenyama and Lee (1997) applied a pragmatic explanation perspective that directly contrasted different approaches to the 
work of Markus (1994) from a critical-theory perspective. They explained how social influences guide the choices 
individuals make, and described individuals as contextually constructed actors on their social environment. This pragmatic 
explanation resulted in unification of the explanatory and understanding aspects of media richness theory that accounts for 
shared meanings and human purpose in addition to inherent media characteristics and broad law-like relationships.  
 
In retrospect it is apparent that different types of explanation and understanding were used to increase scientific knowledge of 
the diverse phenomena surrounding media richness theory. But research remains to be done regarding how people develop 
shared meaning, why they are influenced by social norms and whether probabilistic relationships have causes. Proactive use 
of the explanation-understanding relationship can aid researchers in recognizing the scope of current research and then 




The explanation-understanding framework (Figure 1) is not a deterministic, one-to-one relationship. Instead, multiple types 
of explanation can lead to different aspects of understanding. The relationships shown in Figure 1 represent a fusion of 
concepts from the literature and the relationships seen in the examples developed above, rather than a set of logically 
determined connections. It is likely that other explanation-understanding relationships can be found. Explanation types are 
coexistent, and no one explanation supersedes another as each type adds to the ideal explanatory text of the phenomenon. 
This leads to a reduction in the number of theories required to explain an array of phenomena since mutually supporting 
explanations can be produced within the same theory. This further increases the comprehensibility, and understanding, of the 
phenomenon. 
 
Scientific understanding results, in part, from inquiry into the meanings of human artifacts, intentions and motives in addition 
to causal mechanisms underlying human behavior and the components of information systems. This understanding may be 
based on types of explanation different from those normally provided by the natural sciences. But it is precisely the variety of 
explanation that increases our understanding by providing synthesis of diverse phenomena under a more limited set of causes 
or laws. Information systems research will also benefit by recognition that increased understanding results from obtaining a 
broad general world-picture in addition to causal-mechanical explanations. 
 
Proceedings of the Tenth Americas Conference on Information Systems, New York, New York, August 2004                                                    4185
Hovorka                                                                               Explanation and Understanding in Information Systems 
 
By examining the characteristics of explanation and understanding and the relationship between them, researchers in 
information systems will be better equipped to gauge the scope and limitations of research and to determine the most fruitful 
direction for future research. Although it is possible to dismiss the differences and the relationships as a mere verbal quibble, 
the information systems field will benefit from recognizing and applying the specific characteristics of explanation and 
understanding in research. Each term has attributes related to specific aspects of the information system that will increase our 





































Unification     Probabilistic Laws
Causal mechanisms
Description
Figure 1. Explanation – Understanding Framework 
 
 
Different types of explanation provide information regarding different perspectives of a phenomenon and multiple mutually 
supportive explanations increase scientific understanding. In addition, different explanation types can result from research 
based on different ontologies and epistemologies. By recognizing which types of explanation have not been provided by 
specific research, researchers can chose perspectives and methods that will add to overall understanding. 
  
 
This study make three contributions to the IS research community: 
 
1.) By grounding explanation and understanding in concepts and terminology from the Philosophy of Science, 
researchers are better able to evaluate, critique and extend research efforts. Research streams that develop multiple 
types of explanation approach Railton’s ideal explanatory text by unifying fine-grained causal mechanisms and 
more generalized law-like regularities and by incorporating understanding of human intentions, goals and meanings. 
2.) By emphasizing the concept of understanding as pertaining to human intentions, goals and meanings, we consolidate 
different epistemological perspectives into a more complete world-view of phenomena without diminishing the 
importance of explanation of causal-mechanical regularities observed in information systems. The inclusion of 
understanding allows interpretive, hermeneutic and critical-theory perspectives to be incorporated into explanatory 
information systems research and models.   
3.) Finally, this study demonstrates that by focusing research on identifying causes and causal chains, we may blind 
ourselves to identification of interactions and of phenomena for which there are no causes and no explanation. The 
types of explanation that support the physical sciences (statistical-relevance, covering-law, pragmatic) provide 
explanatory information for research into the technological aspects of information systems. The types of explanation 
commonly provided in the social sciences (pragmatic, functional) lead to understanding of the human components of 
information systems. But the study of information systems is, at least in part, about the interaction and interface 
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between the two. These interactions are not causal for they do not contain temporal order or cite mechanisms for the 
regularities they produce. It is at the interface between the technological and human aspects of the system that many 
interesting research questions reside. The explanation-understanding relationship proposed in this study is crucial in 
its capacity to add explanatory information to an ideal explanatory text of the phenomenon. But at the same time, it 
is important to recognize that there may be no laws, causes or accepted explanation of some phenomena in human 
behavior and that studying these phenomena is critical to unified understanding in IS. 
 
Recognizing the different types of explanation and understanding will aid researchers in synthesizing current and previous 
research and in exposing gaps in the scientific knowledge of phenomena. This framework provides researchers new avenues 
to advance scientific knowledge and to shape the evaluative criteria, identified problems, models, and exemplars in IS 
research. The academic and practitioner communities will benefit by recognizing the scope of research explanations and from 
identifying what aspects of explanation and understanding are deficient in current scientific knowledge of IS phenomenon. 
By examining explanation types and associated terminology and showing the relationship between scientific explanation and 
scientific understanding, researchers are better equipped to recognize opportunities for research as well as to determine how 
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